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"Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto",† 
Terence, Heauton Timorumenos, 163 BCE  
 
 
I am grateful to the APA Committee on Prizes and Lectures for offering me the Romanell 
prize.  I confess to having been quite surprised as I don’t see myself as actively participating in 
debates about naturalism in philosophy. And yet ….  I have said about my approach in 
epistemology and philosophy of science that is naturalist (in a sense that means something to 
me).  So I saw and see the prize not as an acknowledgement of any contribution I have made to 
the philosophical discussion of naturalism, but a challenge to make good on this self-
assessment.  I approach the task with gratitude tinged with some wariness.  What could 
naturalism in philosophy be?  And, is there a form of naturalism that I could claim as also mine? 
My talk today will be divided into three parts.  The first addresses that first question:  
what could naturalism in philosophy be?  The second reflects skeptically on the prospects for 
one common understanding of naturalism in philosophy: that science be the source of answers 
to philosophical questions.  The third proposes a naturalism without science. 
 
Part One:  Naturalism as Opposed to What? 
To answer this question, I consulted both philosophical and lexicographical sources.  Both 
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on “Naturalism”1 and that on “Naturalism in 
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Epistemology”2 give excellent, if noncommittal, surveys of naturalism, but offer nothing that 
could be attached to any view I hold (apart from a brief reference to my socializing moves in the 
epistemology entry).   Dictionaries were revealing in the manner of their unhelpfulness. 
Most dictionary entries for “naturalism” and “natural” devolve the burden of definition to 
“nature,” whose definition in the Oxford English Dictionary has eleven entries, each of which 
has multiple subentries , and only one of which is relevant to philosophy.  A significant number 
of definitions of “naturalism” define by negation, by stating what naturalism abjures.  In 
philosophy, we often sign onto an “ism” to signal what we are not.  If I’m a realist, you can’t 
charge me with relativism or constructivism, if I’m a constructivist, you can’t charge me with 
realism.  I suspect that some of that signalling function persists in implicit or covert ways in 
more explicit discussions.  I have learned from feminist analyses of gender that terms entering 
into contrast relations (like male/female/ feminine/masculine) are rarely adequately 
understood as standalone categories or concepts and in many cases it is the intended contrast 
that is doing much of the work.  So part of this initial investigation includes considering some of 
the contrasts into which naturalism (or nature) enter.  I think that there is a stickiness or 
residue of some of the contrasts that make some possible naturalisms less salient than they 
might be.  .   
The online Oxford English Dictionary offers four definitions of “naturalism”   
 1.  Ethics. Action arising from or based on natural instincts, without 
spiritual guidance; a system of morality or religion derived only from human 
reason and having no basis in revelation. 
 2.  Philosophy. The idea or belief that only natural (as opposed to 
supernatural or spiritual) laws and forces operate in the world; (occasionally) the 
idea or belief that nothing exists beyond the natural world. Also: the idea that 
moral concepts can be analysed in terms of concepts applicable to natural 
phenomena. Cf. naturalist n. 2a. 
3. A style or method characterized by close adherence to, and 
representation of, nature or reality. 
4. Adherence or attachment to what is natural; indifference to convention.3 
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Contemporary meta-ethicists might have fun with the first of these, but it’s the second 
that purports to define philosophical naturalism. Unfortunately, any positive account of 
naturalism in any of these definitions simply refers us to “natural,” so that’s not much help.  
The contrasts are with the supernatural, spiritual, or revelation (presumably divine) so they do 
not narrow the field for naturalism in any useful way, and the fourth contrast “convention, 
seems, without context, a change of subject.  
The Random House Webster College Dictionary, offers three definitions of naturalism, the 
one pertaining to philosophy reading:  
Philosophy.  
1. the view of the world that takes account only of natural elements 
and forces, excluding the supernatural or spiritual. 
2. the belief that all phenomena are covered by laws of science and 
that all teleological explanations are therefore without value.4 
The second definition is consonant with definitions from other sources (and with the 
elaborations in the Stanford Encyclopedia) and adds a further contrast, teleology.  The first 
definition is similar to the OED offerings and shares with the OED the feature of passing the 
buck to “natural.”  Both define “natural” in terms of “nature.”  To get clearer on what 
“naturalism” means, we must go to “nature.” And, “nature” in the OED has multiple definitions, 
each of them with many subheads.  Finally, the 11th definition says of nature that it is 
a. The phenomena of the physical world collectively; esp. plants, animals, 
and other features and products of the earth itself, as opposed to humans and 
human creations.5 
So, the contrast terms to natural or naturalism include “supernatural or spiritual”; 
“convention”; “humans and human creations”; teleology or purposefulness.  Should we 
understand these as close to synonymous or at least in a relation of family resemblance?  
Simon Blackburn’s Philosophical Dictionary confirms the confusion.  Of “nature” he says: “An 
indefinitely mutable term, changing as our scientific conception of the world changes, and at 
best seen as signifying a contrast with something considered not part of nature.”  He goes on,  
Contrasts with nature may include  
 4 
(i) that which is deformed or grotesque, or fails to achieve its proper 
form or function, or just the statistically uncommon or unfamiliar;  
(ii) the supernatural, or the world of gods and invisible agencies,  
(iii) the world of rationality and intelligence, conceived as distinct from 
the biological and physical order 
(iv) that which is manufactured and artificial, or the product of human 
intervention;  
(v) related to that, the world of *convention and artifice.6 
The third of these actually expresses a substantial philosophical thesis, severing rationality 
and intelligence from the biological and physical order.  And notice the association of the 
fourth, “manufactured and artificial or product of human intervention” and the fifth  “the world 
of convention.”  The contrasts can be summed up in a table: 
 
Non-Natural   Natural 
Rationality and intelligence  Biological and physical order (add 
psychological?) 
 





 From this review of lexicography, we can extract two definitions of naturalism:  1) a view 
of the world that takes account only of natural elements and forces, presumed to be biological 
and physical (material) entities and their processes) and that abjures explanation by appeal to 
the supernatural, divine, or whatever transcends the domain of the material.  2) the view that 
all phenomena are covered by the laws of science.  If we treat these as meaning the same thing, 
we assume that scientific inquiry is sufficient to account for all the elements and forces 
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belonging to the biological and physical order.  This is surely an aim of scientific inquiry, but it is 
not clear that we should adopt the assumption. If we take the contrasts seriously, the biological 
and physical world, (the material world) and the referents of the terms on the non-natural side 
of the ledger belong to mutually exclusive domains.   Naturalism as defined in the second 
definition, presupposes that the shape of scientific content is such to enable the provision of 
scientific content to philosophical theses.  In Part Three, I will suggest that the distinction 
between the Natural and the Non-natural, in particular the association of the candidates for 
non-natural with each other simply by being contraries to the same category, limits our 
understanding of what philosophical naturalism could be.  But, first I will explore what is 
possible if we let ourselves be guided by these definitions. 
 
Part Two: Deference to Science? 
I am interested in the concept, knowledge.  Scientific knowledge has been my primary 
object of analysis, but to think about scientific knowledge, one must also think about 
knowledge in general.  Naturalized epistemology refers to a collection of efforts to take 
knowledge out of the realm of the non-natural and into the natural.  By the division above, to 
naturalize epistemology is to show that it is either an element of the biological or physical order 
or that whatever processes give rise to knowledge are themselves forces or processes of the 
biological and physical order (governed or described by biological or physical laws). 
Hilary Kornblith has pursued the first of these strategies in his claims that knowledge is a 
natural kind:  “Cases of knowledge, on this view, constitute a natural kind, and epistemology is 
the empirical study that investigates its properties.”7  One finds out the actual contours of this 
kind by starting with some paradigmatic instances, identifying what they have in common, and 
then classifying or reclassifying other candidates by reference to the properties of those 
paradigmatic kinds.  The strategy is much like a strategy one might pursue with chemical 
elements:  identify some paradigmatic samples of, say uranium, and then determine for other 
radioactive elements whether they share the same atomic structure.  [And, we know with 
uranium and other elements, that different isotopes can be discovered, so the empirical 
investigation yields multiple categories.]  There has been much discussion of Kornblith’s 
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proposal.8  My reservation has to do with the notion of discovery that is relied on.  In the case 
of metals or other standard candidate natural kinds, we encounter something in nature, find 
out whether it is artifactual or accidental and, if not, find similar instances and then classify 
them on the basis of shared characteristics.  Knowledge is not something like lead or helium we 
discover out there.  We identify the paradigmatic cases of knowledge based on our conception 
of what knowledge is.  Any disagreement about that conception will not be resolved by finding 
paradigm cases, as their identification as cases already depends on the conception we bring to 
bear. 
More promising is to think about the norms and standards that govern our identification 
of candidates as knowledge or not knowledge.  Here the ur-philosophical view is that expressed 
by W.V.O. Quine in “Epistemology Naturalized”: “Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls 
into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science.”9   There are different 
possible interpretations of this statement.  The standard one is that the norms are 
psychological and, ultimately, brain processes subjectively understood as norms.  Closely 
related is the more evolutionary view that the norms are simply the processes that enabled our 
ancestors to survive more successfully than their conspecifics, hardened into norms by natural 
selection.  However understood, this proposal, too, has received much attention, and many 
efforts to adapt the ideas.  My response is the same as Richard Grandy’s:  “One question I want 
to press is which chapter of what psychology epistemology is to become?”10   
Grandy wrote that in 1994.  In 2021, one can only echo the French:  Plus ça change, plus 
c’est la même chose.  Grandy surveyed the possible candidates that could serve as the chapter, 
and pronounced them as yet too immature and unable to answer the skeptical question: Am I a 
brain in a vat?  All of the candidate sciences have made great strides forward since then.  What 
are those sciences?  And have the strides they have made enable epistemology to fall into place 
as one of their chapters?  The sciences currently investigating knowledge and cognitive 
processes include: 
Artificial intelligence that hopes to model cognitive processes 
Cognitive psychology that hopes to provide descriptions of human cognitive processes 
 7 
Neuroscience that hopes to characterize the material processes that carry out those 
cognitive processes 
Cognitive Anthropology that studies how humans in communities create knowledge (or 
come to accept representations of the world that suffice for their purposes) 
Sociology that studies how human groups develop and accept representations (that they 
will call knowledge). 
There are two distinct problems facing the hope that these could essentially replace 
philosophical epistemology:   
1. There’s no sign of convergence among these, so Grandy’s question, “which 
psychology” remains. 
2. Either the strides forward in a given discipline still don’t connect to human 
doxastic or epistemic states or there are multiple approaches in a discipline that 
seem non-reconcilable or that make substantive assumptions, in which case 
Grandy’s question, “which chapter?” also remains. 
To press this case, let us look at a few of the candidates: 
Artificial Intelligence research. Artificial intelligence researchers are not united around a 
single goal.  Is or should the point be to create a machine that can perform better than humans 
at a given cognitive task (e.g. play chess, diagnose disease)?  Or is it to create a machine that 
models actual human cognitive processes.  If the latter, should we follow the chapter that is 
logic based or the non-logic based chapter?  This, of course, depends on what we already think 
about human cognitive processing. 
What about machine-learning?  The algorithms that the machine develops are 
inaccessible to the researchers, so we won’t learn about their process let alone human 
cognitive processes from them.  AI, then, unless it undergoes a major unifying transformation, 
is not a candidate, and were it to develop a chapter dedicated to philosophical questions, 
would not replace philosophical epistemology, since it would be riddled with philosophical 
assumptions. 
Neuroscience.  This is another area of research that has seen enormous progress in the 
last decades, but the progress is not towards a unified understanding of the functioning of the 
 8 
brain, but in the proliferation of research areas and approaches.   Neuroscience, like artificial 
intelligence research, is characterized by a major distinction between research that seeks to 
understand how the brain actually works and research that seeks to build systems that can 
perform tasks that the human brain performs.  The former, neural systems research, seeks to 
model the brain and nervous system’s processing, storage, and transmission of information.  
Neural network research, on the other hand, builds algorithms that mimic the operations of a 
human brain to recognize relationships between vast amounts of data. Such networks are used 
in a variety of applications in financial services, from forecasting and marketing research to 
fraud detection and risk assessment.  Neural network research is a form of artificial intelligence 
research, but just because there is an intersection between some AI research and some 
neuroscience research doesn’t mean that the two fields are converging.  A certain amount of 
philosophy of neuroscience research is devoted to understanding the relationship between the 
models of computational neuroscience and the models developed on the basis of imaging of 
actual brains. 
Neuroscience harbors further partitioning.  If we ask, what is the functional unit of the 
nervous system, different research programs will give us different answers.  I give examples of 
reports from two different laboratories. 
Science Daily reported on work at the Callaway lab at the Salk Institute:  
The researchers used imaging technology combined with genetically 
expressed sensors to study the function of thousands of individual neurons 
involved in processing color and shape in the primary visual cortex. During long 
recording periods, roughly 500 possible combinations of color and shape were 
tested to find the stimulus that best activated each visually-responsive neuron. 
The team found that visual neurons selectively responded to color and 
shape along a continuum -- while some neurons were only activated by either a 
specific color or shape, many other neurons were responsive to a particular color 
and shape simultaneously, contrary to long-held notions about how visual 
processing works.11  
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Taking advantage of the enormous advances in imaging technology, this team 
investigates  how Individual neurons respond to color and shape.  The presupposition is that 
individual neurons are the functional units and that study of their behavior will reveal how the 
brain accomplishes everything the brain accomplishes. 
Gerald Edelman and Vernon Mountcastle proposed in 1978 that the cortex was arranged 
into neuronal groups, themselves structured as columns (fn The Mindful Brain) and that these 
were the functional units of the cortex.12  One might think that the greater resolution afforded 
by the kinds of techniques employed by the Salk lab would have left neuronal group theory 
behind.  Instead it has simply facilitated greater detail about the structure of the groups. 
When we examined the network topology of connectivity between 
neurons, we found that the neurons cluster into small world networks that are 
not scale-free, with less than 2 degrees of separation. We found a simple 
clustering rule where connectivity is directly proportional to the number of 
common neighbors, which accounts for these small world networks and 
accurately predicts the connection probability between any two neurons. This 
pyramidal neuron network clusters into multiple groups of a few dozen neurons 
each. The neurons composing each group are surprisingly distributed, typically 
more than 100 μm apart, allowing for multiple groups to be interlaced in the 
same space.13    
Will the brain be parsed into single neurons or into neuronal groups or will researchers 
find that both constitute the functional unit in different contexts?  Whatever the case, as 
sophisticated as the neurosciences have become, neither neuroscience as a whole, nor any of 
its subdisciplines can qualify as the scientific replacement of epistemology.  As neuroscience 
progress, it will undoubtedly reveal, describe and explain, the cognitive processes of cognitive 
agents, but this does not yet fully incorporate or eliminate the normative dimensions of 
philosophical epistemology. 
Cognitive Psychology. Turning to cognitive psychology, we find research on memory, on 
perception, on attention, on reasoning.  And, here, too, we find many “chapters” from which to 
choose. 
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Just focusing on reasoning, we find not only many divergences, but different kinds of 
divergence.  One has to do with conceptions of how reasoning actually proceeds, with 
researchers in mental model theory seeking evidence that deductive reasoning is based on 
imagistic thinking, while the advocates of mental logic theory have tried to prove that it is 
based on verbal thinking.  
Perhaps the theoretical dispute most familiar to philosophers has to do with the status of 
reasoning about probabilities.  Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky claimed that experiments 
showed that humans, even those with knowledge of statistics and of probability theory, quite 
generally fail to reason correctly, instead relying on biased processes, that they called 
heuristics, that frequently led them to the wrong conclusions to problems posed in 
experimental settings.  Kahneman explained their work in the introductory remarks of his 2002 
Nobel lecture: 
Our first joint article examined systematic errors in the casual statistical 
judgments of statistically sophisticated researchers (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1971). Remarkably, the intuitive judgments of these experts did not conform 
to statistical principles with which they were thoroughly familiar. In particular, 
their intuitive statistical inferences and their estimates of statistical power 
showed a striking lack of sensitivity to the effects of sample size. We were 
impressed by the persistence of discrepancies between statistical intuition and 
statistical knowledge, which we observed both in ourselves and in our 
colleagues. We were also impressed by the fact that significant research 
decisions, such as the choice of sample size for an experiment, are routinely 
guided by the flawed intuitions of people who know better. In the terminology 
that became accepted much later, we held a two-system view, which 
distinguished intuition from reasoning. Our research focused on errors of 
intuition, which we studied both for their intrinsic interest and for their value 
as diagnostic indicators of cognitive mechanisms.14  
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 On the other side are Gerd Gigerenzer and his colleagues, according to whom, heuristics 
are not faulty or biased rules.  They are instead strategies that selectively ignore information to 
make decisions faster, more frugally, and/or more accurately than more complex methods.  
(e.g. calculating probabilities).  Instead of treating rationality as the following of content neutral 
rules, and the study of rationality as the study of such rules (for example formal logic) 
Gigerenzer proposes what he calls “Ecological rationality.”  The study of ecological rationality 
investigates in which environments a given strategy is better than other strategies “(better—
not best—because in large worlds the optimal strategy is unknown)”.15  
And, for good measure, here is a philosopher, who, after severely criticizing the 
Kahneman and Tversky approach, advocates not finding an alternative (of the sort Gigerenzer 
proposes) but doing more philosophy: 
“contrary to some of these critics, I do not think that alternative 
approaches to studying decision-making should necessarily come up with 
alternative concepts of rationality (such as ecological rationality proposed by 
Gerd Gigerenzer—see e.g.: Goldstein and Gigerenzer 2002). Instead I suggest 
that we need more philosophical scrutiny in uncovering the presence of value 
commitments, such as commitments to notions of rationality, and in 
understanding their epistemic role in research ...”16   
 
It’s worth considering these examples.  As philosophers, we are often seduced by the 
beautiful empirical work performed by our colleagues in the various relevant sciences.  We 
meet one beautiful set of experiments, drop our professional wariness, and proceed as if the 
beautiful work is not just true but comprehensive.  But the proliferation of research approaches 
with their different presuppositions shows that Grandy’s question is as appropriate now as it 
was 25 years ago.  Don’t get me wrong,  I think there’s lots of wonderful science being done in 
all these disciplines and in their chapters.  They just don’t begin to give us an integrated story of 
how humans process information, how we reason, how we know, let alone provide a 
connection to epistemological norms.  And, as Malecka points out, even if we were to eschew 
the philosophical questions proper to (philosophical) epistemology, sorting through these 
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different potential candidates, understanding the assumptions and values built into them 
requires philosophical analysis, so philosophy is not eliminated. 
 
Part Three   Naturalism without Natural Science 
It’s hard to know whether the definitions of naturalism found in the dictionaries are culled 
from philosophical practice or statements or whether philosophical thinking about naturalism 
follows lines laid down in the dictionaries.  I think it actually runs both ways.  In any case, I 
suspect the distinctions marked by the dictionaries have had a limiting, if not actually 
pernicious, effect on philosophical thinking, closing off possibilities of analysis.  In my naiveté 
twenty years ago, I claimed for myself a naturalist identification based not on the thought that 
knowledge was a natural kind or that knowledge could be accounted for by the laws of science, 
whatever they are, but on the thought that the subjects of knowledge, the cognitive agents we 
are, are empirical subjects.  “The approach I take in this book is naturalist in the sense that it 
treats the conditions of knowledge production by human cognitive agents (empirical rather 
than transcendental subjects) as the starting point for any philosophical theory of 
knowledge.”17 (I probably should have said “my philosophical theory)  As human, empirical 
subjects, we are limited (“bounded” as Herbert Simon put it), embodied (spatially and 
temporally located), become endowed with  particular sets of points of view, values and norms 
as we progress through time and space (“experience”).  Our limitations, forms of embodiment, 
perspectives, values and norms change as we go through life. 
Secondly, I took “knowledge” to be a status term, ascribed to psychological states like 
beliefs as well as to their content, for example, when we talk about scientific knowledge 
(possessed by all and by none in particular). So, knowledge is not something out there to be 
discovered, like gold, helium, polonium, goldfinches.  And, its properties are not to be 
discovered by examining  samples, whether of psychological states like belief or of content like 
science textbooks.   
I went on:   
A philosophical theory of knowledge spells out the conditions that our use 
of the term “knowledge” indicates must be satisfied for correct ascription.  
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Neither purely descriptive nor purely prescriptive, it requires a characterization of 
empirical subjects and of the situations in which they seek to produce content 
that has the status of knowledge.  This is descriptive.  And it involves a 
characterization of the conditions satisfaction of which they take that status to 
imply, that is, a spelling out of the prescriptions implicit in the ascription and 
withholding of that status.18  
 In this regard, “knowledge” is like other status terms.  For example, the value of a piece 
of currency is not fixed by the natural processes that give rise to the physical item, whether 
special paper made with certain kinds of fiber, or metal given a particular shape, but by being 
assigned a value by an entity entrusted with the authority to do so (the Federal Reserve or the 
Treasury).  Because the value of the piece of currency does not flow from the elements and 
processes that went into the making of the particular physical item, we say its value as a 
medium of exchange is fixed by convention. Could the conditions satisfaction of which confer 
on a candidate the status of knowledge be conventions?   
The contemporary philosophical discussions of convention descend from David Lewis’s 
Convention.19 Lewis says:  
A regularity R in the behavior of members of a population P when they are 
agents in a recurrent situation S is a convention if and only if in any instance of S 
among members of P, 
1) Everyone conforms to R; 
2) Everyone expects everyone else to conform to R; 
3) Everyone prefers to conform to R on condition that the others do, since S 
is a coordination problem and uniform conformity to R is a proper 
coordination equilibrium in S.20  p. 42 
Put a bit differently, a convention is a regularity that holds in a group such that everyone 
expects everyone else to conform to the regularity/convention, and it is to the benefit of each 
member of the group that all members conform to it.  The second clause is important.  It, 
together with the fact that universal conformation benefits each member, is what entitles 
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others to criticize a member who does not conform.  Lewis says that conventions are solutions 
to coordination problems.  What are coordination problems?  They are situations in which two 
or more agents must choose among a set of options, one among those options being an 
equilibrium solution, i.e. a solution in which each agent does the best they could given the 
choices of the other agents.  Lewis is forthright about his reliance on game theory, and indeed 
much of the book is expressed in the language of the theory of games of coordination (such as 
prisoner’s dilemma).  The challenge is to identify the rational choice for participating agents, 
understood as the choice that has the greatest probability of a positive outcome for the agent 
(not the choice of the highest outcome for the agent).  I will not go any further into the details 
of game theory.  The important point is that the agents of game theory are empirical in at least 
the sense proposed by Simon, namely their rationality is bounded, meaning they do not have 
access to complete information.  In particular, they do not know how the other agents will 
choose.   
The agents in Lewis’s theory and in the proposals of game theoretic solutions to other 
puzzles, such as the evolution of signaling or of the social contract 21 are trying to find solutions 
to a common problem in isolation.  What they don’t know is what other agents with whom 
coordinated action will yield a good solution for all believe or intend about the situation they 
share.  Identifying the rational choice for individual agents in these situations does indeed 
constitute an interesting intellectual puzzle, but it fails to take advantage of the full range of 
properties of empirical subjects.   
In my work exploring an alternative to standard accounts of scientific objectivity and, by 
extension, scientific knowledge, I argued that the limitations of sense and reason, of point of 
view, of particular values are overcome by the sociality of empirical subjects.22 Those 
limitations have a classic counterpart in scientific reasoning in the problem of 
underdetermination.  The dependence of evidential relations on background assumptions 
generates the question: how can we ascertain that the background assumptions we knowingly 
or unknowingly rely on are worthy of that reliance?  The answer I offered was that this 
assurance comes through the survival of those assumptions in critical discursive interaction, 
carried out in situations satisfying certain conditions.  My associated claim was that the 
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standards that regulate critical interaction are themselves the outcome of critical discursive 
interactions.  To me this meant that the standards, at least some of which I am happy to call 
norms, have the status of conventions.  They are conventions in the sense that they are rules 
that emerge in the course of community interaction that individual members hold one another 
accountable to.  They have no status apart from the community’s agreement to abide by them 
as means to satisfying a common goal.  But this understanding of convention and of the 
conventional status of our epistemic norms violates the ground rules of Lewisian convention 
and standard game theory accounts of conventions.  They are solutions to coordination 
problems, but they are not solutions individual agents identify through calculating probabilities 
and expected utilities.  In the game theoretic literature, these can be identified by the theorist, 
but there is no guarantee that individual empirical subjects confronting a dilemma will find 
their way to them.  They need more information to do so. 
So, must I find another way to describe the status of the standards that are a part of my 
account of scientific knowledge or is there something problematic with the Lewisian approach 
to convention?  I think I’d rather say that the Lewisian approach to convention, and the game 
theoretic analysis of social phenomena is insufficiently naturalistic.  The agents of game theory 
differ from the traditional agents of epistemology only in having limits placed on the inputs to 
their reasoning.  If we are going to be naturalists (and I am not assuming that Lewis and his 
followers claim that identification), we ought to be able to take advantage of the full range of 
human features, our limitations, the value-ladenness of our points of view, yes, but also our 
resources, especially our sociality, our ability to communicate with others in order to overcome 
those limitations and together arrive at more robust solutions to common problems.  In this 
attitude, I am encouraged by a passage from an essay by the philosopher Cristina Biccchieri, 
herself a practitioner of game theoretic analysis.  Much of Bicchieri’s work has involved 
identifying additional conditions agents must satisfy, assumptions, information, or norms they 
must carry into the dilemma in order to arrive at a satisfactory solution, but in the essay 
“Covenants Without Swords” she discusses a particular set of experiments. 
One variation in social dilemma experiments, which dramatically increases 
cooperation rates, is allowing subjects to discuss the dilemma. [My emphasis] 
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There are two possible explanations for this “communication effect.”  One is that 
communication enhances group identity, the other that communication elicits 
social norms.  I argue that the reason for this departure from normative rational 
choice is the working of norms; if correct, this conclusion has important strategic 
implications for institutional design and public policies that encourage social 
cooperation.23  
 
So, when real agents are put into coordination game situations, better results come from 
allowing the agents to communicate rather than seeing what it takes for them to accomplish 
the results calculating machines say are best for them.  I think this may be surprising only in the 
context of the conceptions of nature and naturalism built into the definitions reviewed in Part 
One. As noted, some of the contrasts in those definitions already have philosophical 
assumptions built into them, in which case we ought not feel constrained to conform to them.  
When we treat ‘natural” and “nature” as having single unified meanings, their contraries 
acquire a stickiness, each one bringing the others along, constituting a reservoir of meaning 
that haunts the concept of nature and the natural that opposes them to the products of human 
agency.  This residue conjoins 
The statistically anomalous 
The world of supernatural or invisible agencies 
The world of rationality and intelligence (conceived as distinct from the biological and 
physical order) 
That which is manufactured or artificial, or the product of human intervention 
The world of convention and artifice 
When brought out of the shadows, the reservoir dissolves. There is nothing supernatural 
or statistically anomalous about the agreements emerging from those interactions that stabilize 
our representations and inferences; and the world of rationality and intelligence conceived as 
distinct from the biological and physical order becomes unmoored from reality, and not the 
intelligence of the empirical subjects whose capacities and aspirations I claim ought to be the 
subject matter of epistemology.  Empirical subjects have limitations, but they also have 
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productive capacities.  Neither symphonies nor scientific theories would appear in the natural 
world without humans to create them, but this does not push them into the world of the 
supernatural or non-natural.   At the same time, there is a difference between a mountain 
produced by movement of the tectonic plates or the upwelling of magma from inside the earth 
and a mountain made for Disneyland; or between curative herbs picked from field and forest 
and chemical compounds produced in a pharmaceutical laboratory.   
My point is that the line between the natural and the unnatural gets drawn improperly 
when the reservoir of meaning loaded into the contraries is not attended to.  Those contrasts 
impart different meanings to “natural,” different reasons to use the concept.  Sometimes we 
mean a contrast between the world of biological and physical matter and forces on the one 
hand and something else supposed to transcend or exist beyond that world on the other.  
Sometimes we mean a contrast between what we humans discover in that world and what we 
make.  There isn’t a single definition of “natural” that can guide our philosophical reflection. 
Where some reflection has missed opportunities is in conflating the multiple contrasts to the 
natural as belonging to the same category, placing human intelligence and creativity in the 
same category as the supernatural or the transcendent, placing the conventional in the same 
categories as artifice or the supernatural.  Efforts at appositive characterization of nature, 
natural, or naturalism are hampered by the stickiness of the contrasts. 
There is a way to read the definitions less as definitions than as reflecting two motivations 
for pursuing a naturalist program in philosophy.  One is dissatisfaction with a priori theorizing 
that treads unwarrantedly on the empirical.  Something like that stands behind Quine’s famous 
dictum and the efforts to naturalize epistemology by treating its subject matter as more 
appropriately addressed by one or another of the sciences.  But the sciences are not ready to 
take on this task, and epistemological reflection guided by various underlying metaphysical 
commitments persists.  Another is a wish to detach the philosophical from the theological, to 
separate the human from the divine, to avoid recourse to the suprahuman in engaging in that 
epistemological reflection.  This ambition, however, need not be concerned with generating 
claims about what there is, but can instead be understood as a stance towards philosophical 
reflection, a stance that centers the capacities and limitations of empirical subjects, that is, of 
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humans and all our activities and products.  This naturalism without science would constitute 
not a doc trine but a constraint.  But just as it disallows the suprahuman, it incorporates as the 
source of problems and analyses all that is human and human made – still a broad set of 







1 Papineau, David, "Naturalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2021 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/naturalism/>.  
2 Rysiew, Patrick, "Naturalism in Epistemology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 
2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/epistemology-naturalized/>.  
3  “naturalism, n.” OED Online (Oxford, UK : Oxford University Press, 2021 
www.oed.com/view/Entry/12537.) accessed April 2, 2021.  
4 Random House Webster College Dictionary (New York: Random House, 1991) p. 901. 
5 "nature, n." OED Online, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, June 2021, 
www.oed.com/view/Entry/125353. Accessed April 2, 2021. 
6 Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford: Osford University Press, 1994) 
pp. 256-7. 
7 Hilary Kornblith, “Naturalism: Both Metaphysical and Epistemological”, Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy, XIX: 39–52. Reprinted in Kornblith, A Naturalistic Epistemology: Selected Papers, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2014. Pp. 104-118), p. 117. 
8 See Rysiew, op. cit. 
9 W.V.O. Quine, , “Epistemology Naturalized”, in Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, 
(New York: Columbia University Press. 1969, pp. 69-90), p. 82. 
10 Richard Grandy, “Epistemology Naturalized and ‘Epistemology Naturalized’” Midwest Studies 
in Philosophy XIX (1994) pp. 341-349. 
11 Salk Institute. "Deciphering how the brain encodes color and shape: Study reveals how the 
brain processes the external world using overlapping visual circuits." ScienceDaily. ScienceDaily, 
27 June 2019. <www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/06/190627164751.htm>. 
12 Gerald Edelman and Vernon Mountcastle, The Mindful Brain (Cambridge, MQ: MIT Press, 
1978) 
13 Rodrigo Perin, Thomas K. Berger, and Henry Markram, “A Synaptic Organizing 




14 Daniel Kahneman, “Maps of Bounded Rationality” 
<https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2002/kahneman/lecture/> accessed 2 
July, 2021. 
15 Gerd Gigerenzer and Wolfgang Gaissmaier, “Heuristic Decision Making” Annual Review of 
Psychology (2012) 62: 451-82. P. 456 
16 Magdalena Malecka, “Knowledge, Behavior and Policy” Synthese 5 Feb. 2021, 
accessed online:  https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03026-6 
17 Helen E. Longino, The Fate of Knowledge (Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press, 2001) p. 
10 
 18Ibid. 
19 David Lewis, Convention (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002) 
20 Lewis, op.cit. p. 42. 
21 See, for example, Brian Skyrms, The Evolution of the Social Contract (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014) and “Evolution of Signaling systems with Multiple Senders and 
Receivers” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B (364, 1518 (2009: 771-779. 
22 Longino, Science as Social Knowledge (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990) and 
Longino, op.cit. 
23 Cristina Bicchieri, “Covenants Without Swords” (Rationality and Society (2002) 14, 
2:192-228) p. 193. 
 
